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Abstract
In ABC v. St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust, the High Court rejected the argument that
doctors have a legal duty to disclose actionable genetic risks to a patient’s relatives. This
article reconsiders the concept of a duty to disclose actionable genetic risks in the
context of widening perceptions of legal harm and developing professional and public
perceptions of corresponding wrongs.
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Introduction
When should information about future genetic risks be disclosed to a patient’s unsus-
pecting relative? This question has troubled genetics professionals for over a decade.1
However, the question of whether a clinician owes a legal duty of care to disclose a
genetic risk to a patient’s relative was not considered by the English courts until May last
year in ABC v. St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust.2 This case presented a particularly
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difficult legal challenge because it concerned a number of competing interests affecting
patients, their relatives and the health professionals who care for them. Nevertheless, on
the facts of ABC there was neither an established legal wrong nor an established legal
harm, thereby making it relatively easy for the judge to reject the claim on the basis that
any extension of the duty of care would amount to more than an incremental develop-
ment which was contrary to the way in which the law of negligence ought to progress.3
This article considers the implications of imposing a duty to disclose actionable genetic
risks to relatives in a more developmental context, which it is argued more accurately
reflects the values of the patients, relatives and doctors involved.
The article begins with a discussion of the relationship between ‘wrong’ and ‘harm’ in
the context of the tort of negligence. This discussion is particularly important in cases
such as ABC where the analysis focussed on the issue of whether there was a legal wrong
in the context of a situation where there was no established legal harm. Following this
discussion, the article separates the concepts of legal wrong and legal harm, and analyses
how developments in the law, professional genetic practice and in the empirical evidence
of public opinion might lead one to question the judge’s reliance on traditional
approaches which do not appear to reflect current values in this context. Towards this
aim, the article discusses developments in the recognition of legal harm in the repro-
ductive context. It is argued that the existence of a legal wrong in frustrated reproductive
choice cases has influenced development of the recognition of novel legal harm. This
article analyses how the harm alleged in ABC might map onto this existing legal doc-
trine. After arguing that the existence of a legally recognized wrong can influence the
development of a legally recognized harm, the article then addresses whether the con-
verse is also possible; in other words, whether the existence of legal harm can similarly
influence the development of novel legal wrong. This analysis is more pertinent to the
result in ABC, which focussed on the lack of a legal wrong in the context of non-
disclosure of genetic information to relatives. Here the discussion focusses on the policy
reasons which were employed in the case to deny that doctors owe a duty of care. The
traditional view that patient confidentiality should be paramount and that the right not to
know should be protected by default are challenged as out of touch with genetic pro-
fessionals, patients and the public’s views regarding the sharing of genetic information
within families. The article argues that professional, patient and public attitudes to
genetic information sharing are evolving such that there is a widening perception that
a failure to disclose actionable genetic information is a wrong which can lead to action-
able harm. Where the law does not reflect public and professional values, we might
question adherence to incrementalism that prevents the law from reflecting these values.
As Jane Stapleton acknowledged many years ago, areas of the law which have developed
incrementally tend to be areas where the ‘silliest rules’ now exist and where ‘criticism is
almost universal’.4
3. ABC, para 13.
4. J. Stapleton, ‘In Restraint of Tort’, in P. Birks, ed., Frontiers of Liability. Vol. 2 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 95.
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Background
The essence of the tort of negligence is a wrong which leads to a harm. Both of these
elements have historically been essential to establishing a claim. There is no such thing
as negligence in the air such that, no matter how carelessly a person acts, they have not
breached their duty to another and thus it might be argued that there is no legal wrong
that could be recognized in the tort of negligence. On this perspective, there is no stand-
alone duty to be careful.5 However, some commentators take a different view of duties of
care in negligence, according to which if A owes B a duty of care of some description, A
will actually have a legal duty to be careful.6 McBride describes holders of the former
view as cynics and the latter as idealists. According to the idealistic view of duties of care
in negligence, if A is said to owe B a duty to take care not to do X in a given situation, A
will have a primary obligation to take care not to do X such that there is intrinsic wrong if
he does do X. If B also suffers a loss as a result of A doing X, he will usually incur a
secondary obligation to pay damages to B.7 The cynical view requires us to work back-
wards from the harm such that the existence of a harm influences the recognition and,
consequently the development of the concept of legal wrongs. This distinction between
cynics and idealists becomes more difficult to describe where there is an adverse out-
come, but it is not one which the law recognizes as harmful. Here the conclusion that
there is no harm and that the carelessness does not therefore amount to a wrong might
seem unduly unfair to the victim, especially if the outcome is one which the other party
was actively employed to prevent. In these circumstances, the idealistic view of duties of
care might be favourable even if it leads to the conclusion that the claimant suffered a
legal wrong but they will not receive compensation for it because the law does not
recognize the particular outcome as harmful. The relationship between wrong and harm
in developing duties of care in negligence was particularly pertinent in ABC where
neither carelessness nor harm could be easily established.
ABC v. St Georges healthcare NHS trust
The claimant in ABC was a woman whose father had shot and killed her mother in 2007.
He was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility and
sentenced to a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. In 2009, the claimant’s
father received a diagnosis of Huntington’s disease. Huntington’s disease is a serious
progressive neurodegenerative genetic condition. If a parent is affected, there is a 50%
chance that his or her child will also be affected, but onset is not until adulthood. Thus
there was a 50% chance that the claimant also had the Huntington’s disease gene. The
5. D. Priel, ‘Tort Law of Cynics’, Modern Law Review 75 (2014), p. 703; P. Cane (ed.)
Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 6th ed, 1999), p. 58.
6. N. McBride, ‘Duties of Care – Do They Really Exist?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24
(2004), pp. 417–441. I would to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the
relevance of this literature.
7. N. McBride, ‘Duties of Care’.
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health professionals looking after the father sought his consent to disclose his diagnosis
to his daughter, which he refused. No attempt was therefore made to inform the daughter,
who was pregnant at the time, of her risk or the risk to her unborn child. Following the
birth of her child in 2013, the claimant was diagnosed with Huntington’s disease. Her
daughter has not been tested as it is contrary to usual medical practice to test for this adult
onset genetic mutation in childhood. However, given that the claimant has the disease,
there is a 50% chance that her daughter possesses the gene.
The claimant alleges that the failure to tell her about her father’s condition was
actionable negligence and a violation of her rights under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The focus here is on the action in negligence, where the
claimant portrays her harm as having arisen from the failure to have the opportunity to
choose an abortion.8 She argues that had she been informed of her father’s condition she
would have undergone genetic testing. Once this showed positive she would have chosen
to terminate her pregnancy. The claimant alleges that if her daughter does have the gene,
she will incur expenses which could have been avoided. For a number of reasons this
claim was difficult to establish. First, the outcome suffered by the claimant is not
established as a legally recognized harm. Furthermore, irrespective of the outcome, it
is not currently recognized to be legally wrong to fail to warn a patient’s relatives of
genetic risks. Such claims are further hampered by the fact that, if a duty did exist, it may
come into conflict with the well-established duty to maintain patient confidentiality.
However, ABC represents one example of a number of potential non-disclosure grie-
vances where legal wrong and/or legal harm could be more easily established. Further-
more, the case comes at a time of rapid development in genetic medicine, and in the way
that genetic professionals perceive patients and families, which reflects wider percep-
tions of what is considered wrongful.
Legal interpretations of wrong and harm in frustrated
reproductive choice
English law recognizes the importance of reproductive choice. Article 12 of the Eur-
opean Convention on Human Rights recognizes that people have the right to found a
family. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 also recognizes that to some
extent people should be able to choose the characteristics of their children.9 On the other
hand, the choice not to have a child is recognized. A woman can choose to abort a foetus
on a number of grounds,10 or undergo sterilization so as not to have any, or any more,
children. Failure to respect these reproductive rights can constitute a wrong which would
be a breach of a duty of care. However, these reproductive interests crystallize in the
context of relationships. A healthcare practitioner will owe a duty to respect a person’s
8. The claimant also alleged psychiatric harm although no evidence of this was presented in
the case. The psychiatric harm claim is not considered here as it is the focus of an extended
case comment I have written; V. Chico, ‘Doctors Under No Duty to Warn Patients’
Relatives of Genetic Risks’, Professional Negligence 32 (2016), pp. 82–85.
9. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act schedule 2 1ZA.
10. Abortion Act 1967 s 1 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d).
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reproductive choices where he or she has undertaken to assist the person with their
reproductive aim. It is not similarly an act of wrongdoing for doctors to fail to seek
people out to assist them with their reproductive aims. Thus the claimant in ABC had not
been subjected to any legally recognized wrong when the reproductive risk information
was not disclosed to her. Furthermore, the essence of the claimant’s cause of action was
that she had a daughter who she would have elected not to have if she had known about
her, or her daughter’s, genetic risk.11 In addition to the absence of a legal wrong, the
framing of the harm in terms of the birth of a child is problematic, as this is not an
outcome that the courts clearly categorize as legally actionable harm. For the legal
cynics, this lack of harm will support the argument that even if the doctor’s actions
could be considered careless, there is no wrong upon which a duty of care could be
established. Thus, in the context of the factual matrix of ABC, the High Court judge was
content to strike the case out on the basis that there was no reasonably arguable duty of
care.12 Leave has been granted to appeal.
While the courts might be able to maintain the position that there is no reasonably
arguable duty of care such that the claim is bound to fail where there is no established
wrong or harm, they may not be able to sustain this clear-cut position in the face of an
established legal wrong, and/or an outcome which the law is prepared to recognize as
harmful. This is important in the context of a frustrated reproductive choice, where
English law has developed from a position of refusing to recognize harm in McFarlane
v. Tayside Health Board,13 to recognizing a broad conception of harm only 3 years later
in Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust.14
Non-disclosure of genetic information: Developing perceptions
of legally recognized harm
In ABC, the defendants were prepared to proceed on the basis that injury to the claimant
would have been reasonably foreseeable if the defendant failed to inform her that her
father had Huntington’s disease.15 The upshot of this was that the judge did not address
the issue of harm, focussing instead on whether a failure to inform a patient’s relative of
genetic risks was a wrong in respect of which doctors16 owed a legal duty. However, the
decision to concede harm without discussing the point is precarious because the recog-
nition of the birth of a child as legal harm conflicts with 16 years of case law.
In McFarlane, the House of Lords acknowledged that Mrs McFarlane’s pregnancy
was a direct and foreseeable consequence of the doctor’s carelessness in giving negligent
information that Mr McFarlane had been rendered infertile after a vasectomy. Thus it
seems that they perceived a wrong which had a direct causal link to the birth of the child.
However, the House allowed the hospital to escape the consequences of that wrong on
11. The importance of the mother’s and the daughter’s risk is discussed below.
12. ABC, para 31.
13. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59.
14. Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52.
15. ABC, para 11.
16. Nicol J. restricted his judgment to doctors rather than health professionals generally.
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the basis that the costs associated with the birth of a child were not actionable harm.17
This supports the idealistic view that there is a duty not to be careless irrespective of the
outcome of that carelessness. Although remedies are based on outcomes so the recog-
nition of a wrong alone will not attract a remedy. However, in ‘wrongful birth’, the
existence of a wrong without recognition of harm appears to have led to development in
the notion of legal harm.
InMcFarlane, the House approached the question of the content of the doctor’s duty
from the perspective of distributive justice.18 The notion of the tort of negligence as a
mechanism for distributing burdens in a way which is fair or optimal for society is
often contrasted with the concept of corrective justice, which reflects the idea that
liability should rectify the injustice inflicted on one person by another.19 The latter is
arguably more conceptually straightforward because the former is often underpinned
by diverse theoretical perspectives regarding fair and optimal resource allocation for
society. Although some legal scholars adopt theoretical approaches to distributive
justice,20 in the wrongful birth cases the English courts adopted an intuitive approach
to determining what might achieve distributive justice. Lord Steyn felt that the ques-
tion of whether the harm should be legally actionable could be decided by asking the
commuter on the London Underground whether the parents of an unplanned but
healthy child should be able to sue the doctor or hospital for the costs of bringing
up the child.21 In his view, an ‘overwhelming number of ordinary men and women
would answer this question with an emphatic ‘‘No’’’ based on their views as to what is
‘morally acceptable and what is not’.22 This led the Lords to conclude that the birth of a
healthy child is generally viewed as ‘a good and valuable thing’ and, therefore, not
legally actionable harm.23
The refusal to recognize that the birth of a child could constitute harm led to two
variants of McFarlane. In Parkinson v. Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust24 a
mother sought to recover the costs of raising her son who was born following a negligent
sterilization. Incidentally, the child had a disability. Bound by the decision in McFar-
lane, the Court of Appeal refused to award the ordinary costs of raising the child.
However, it was prepared to award the extra expenses associated with the child’s dis-
ability. Like the House of Lords inMcFarlane, the Court of Appeal approached the issue
of whether the mother had sustained actionable damage from the perspective of
17. Prior to McFarlane the courts had recognized that the costs of raising a child were
recoverable where they were a direct consequence of a wrongfully caused birth. See, for
example, Emeh v. Kensington and Westminster Area Health Authority [1985].
18. McFarlane, Lord Steyn 82.
19. E. Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice in a Nutshell’, The University of Toronto Law Journal 52
(2002), pp. 349–356.
20. P. Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’, New Zealand Law Review 4 (2001), pp. 401–
420.
21. McFarlane Lord Steyn 82.
22. McFarlane Lord Steyn 82.
23. McFarlane Lord Steyn 82.
24. Parkinson v. Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ. 530.
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distributive justice.25 Although both Brooke LJ and Hale LJ accepted the McFarlane
position that the mother could not claim the ordinary costs of child rearing, they were not
prepared to conclude that the mother of a disabled child should recover nothing. Lady
Hale was uneasy about the McFarlane decision to deny what would on normal legal
principles be recoverable.26 She said:
Whatever the commuter on the Underground might think of the claim for Catherine McFar-
lane, it might reasonably be thought that he or she would not consider it unfair, unjust or
disproportionate that the person who had undertaken to prevent conception, pregnancy and
birth and negligently failed to do so were held responsible for the extra costs of caring for
and bringing up a disabled child.27
Thus they were unwilling to maintain a position which denied any recovery in the face
of what they considered to be a clear legal wrong. On this basis, the court was prepared to
make an award relating to the disability even though it was clear that the disability was
not caused by the negligence. Thus it seems that the desire to do practical justice for the
wronged claimant in Parkinson persuaded the Court of Appeal to make an immaterial
distinction to House of Lords precedent in order to recognize harm. Parkinson is not the
only claim where the court’s desire to provide a remedy for the wronged claimant led it
to recognize an outcome, which is not materially different to the outcome inMcFarlane,
as harmful.
In Rees Karina Rees underwent sterilization because she felt that her severe visual
impairment would make it difficult for her to care for a child. She conceived a healthy
son after the sterilization was performed negligently and claimed the costs of raising
him. A seven-member House of Lords refused to overturn McFarlane, maintaining that
parenting a healthy child is a valuable experience which the law should not recognize as
harm. However, similar to Parkinson, their Lordships were uneasy about leaving the
claimant without a remedy in the face of what they perceived to be a clear legal wrong.
Lord Bingham questioned ‘the fairness of a rule which denies the victim of a legal wrong
any recompense’.28 Along with the remaining majority, he felt that there should be some
recovery to ‘mark the injury and loss’29 in all such cases. On this analysis, the healthy
mother of a healthy child would also be entitled to a remedy. Lord Millett agreed that the
mother should be entitled to a remedy. However, he took a different approach to the basis
of an award. Rather than a means of marking ‘the injury and loss’, according to Lord
Millett the award, which took the form of a conventional sum, was to recognize the
wrong done.30 Lord Millett spoke in the language of rights and held that Ms Rees had
been denied an aspect of human dignity, an important human right which he felt should
25. Throughout the judgments of Brooke L.J. and Hale L.J.
26. Parkinson, para 79.
27. Parkinson, para 95.
28. Rees Lord Bingham, para 8.
29. Rees Lord Bingham, para 8.
30. Rees Lord Millett, para 123, Lord Bingham, para 8, Lord Nicholls, para 17, and Lord Scott,
para 148.
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be protected by law.31 This approach could be seen as reflecting the idealistic perspective
that there can be a stand-alone duty not to be careless irrespective of the outcome of the
carelessness.
Like these wrongful birth cases, the harm in ABC was presented as being the birth of a
child. Although, conversely to existing precedent, in ABC the defendants were prepared
to concede harm. However, if the concept of harm is argued in the Court of Appeal in
ABC, this is likely to lead to a consideration of the wrongful birth litigation which
demonstrates that the question of whether the birth of a child is encompassed by the
duty of care present in sterilization procedures is still a matter of debate. The essence of
the mother’s claim in ABC is that the birth of her daughter is a harmful outcome because,
if she had known of the risk, she would have undergone testing to see whether she (the
mother) had the Huntington’s gene and, if she had, she would have terminated the
pregnancy. It is not entirely clear whether her reasons for doing this would have been
because she would develop Huntington’s or because of the risk that the child would
develop Huntington’s.
Let us assume first that her argument is that the birth of her daughter is harmful
because of the costs associated with the impending possible onset of Huntington’s
disease in her daughter. This type of argument might find most support from the Court
of Appeal decision in Parkinson. However arguing that the birth of the claimant’s child
is harmful because the child has a disability is problematic where the child does not in
fact have a disability. The claimant’s daughter is, as far as we know, currently perfectly
healthy. She has a 50% chance of suffering from Huntington’s disease in the future
because she has a 50% chance of possessing the gene that we now know her mother
possesses. This situation can be distinguished from the case of Parkinson (where the
child actually suffered from an existing disability) in two key ways. First, it is not clear
whether the claimant’s daughter will ever develop Huntington’s because she has a 50%
chance of not possessing Huntington’s gene. If the harm in this case depends upon the
child’s Huntington’s susceptibility, it seems to make sense that she can only recover if
she proves to have that susceptibility. However, there is a very strong professional ethic
against testing in childhood for adult onset genetic disorders.32 Furthermore there is no
evidence that the claimant wants her daughter to be tested or, for that matter, that any
professional is willing to test her.
The latency of Huntington’s disease presents further problems for the mother’s claim
for damages based on the additional expenses which she will incur if her daughter does
have Huntington’s gene. Although Huntington’s disease has a wide variation in onset
age, the average age at onset is 40 years,33 which means that the claimant’s daughter is
unlikely to incur any additional expenses in childhood even if she does have Hunting-
ton’s gene. If her daughter does have the gene, she will only manifest this in adulthood.
Thus any expenses associated with it will be incurred directly to the adult daughter, at
31. Rees Lord Millett, para 123.
32. For the importance of this in the context of a legal challenge see Re Y and Z (Minors) [2013]
EWHC 953 (Fam).
33. R.H. Myers, ‘Huntington’s Disease Genetics’, NeuroRX 1 (2004), pp. 255–262.
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which point there is no legal parental responsibility to care for, or finance one’s
offspring.
Thus the claimant in ABC is likely to experience significant difficulty in aligning her
claim to recover additional expenses involved in raising her child with the claim in
Parkinson. She might have a stronger claim that she has suffered harm if she argues
that the additional costs she will incur relate to her desire not to have a child, as opposed
to her daughter’s potential disability. The Particulars of Claim state:
She pleads that if she had been informed of her father’s condition, she would have under-
gone a test to see if she had it as well. Once that showed positive, she would have terminated
her pregnancy.34
There is no suggestion that the claimant would have undergone prenatal testing to
determine her daughter’s Huntington’s gene status, which suggests that the knowledge
that she herself would develop Huntington’s was instrumental to her choice to terminate.
From this perspective, the claim is more closely aligned with Rees than Parkinson.
The award of the conventional sum in Rees was not explicitly related to the fact that
the mother was disabled. However, even if the mother’s disability is deemed to be a
material fact in a future judicial assessment of Rees, the claimant in ABC has a strong
claim to a conventional sum in any event because she suffers from Huntington’s
disease and it is this factor, had she known it, that would have affected her desire to
have a child.
Although LordMillett presented an idealistic perspective of the conventional sum as a
recognition of the wrong done in carelessly failing to sterilize Ms Rees, a number of
commentators adopt a different interpretation of Rees, reflecting a more cynical view
of the duty of care. They argue that the conventional sum is a recognition of a new form
of harm as opposed to the simple recognition of a wrong.35 Lord Scott spoke clearly in
the language of compensation and argued that the purpose of the conventional sum was
to ‘compensate the respondent for being deprived of the benefit that she was entitled to
expect’.36 Although he said the conventional sum was a recognition of wrong, Lord
Millett also seemed to recognize that some further adverse outcome should result from
that wrong. In Rees Lord Millett effectively acknowledged that there was a harm in the
form of an interference with the interest in autonomy which was occasioned by disre-
specting the ‘right to limit the size of [one’s] family’.37 If harm in the form of
34. ABC, para 2.
35. D. Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’, Modern Law Review 70 (2007), pp. 59–
88; N. Priaulx, The Harm Paradox: Tort Law and the Unwanted Child in an Era of Choice
(Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); N. Priaulx, ‘Joy to the World! A (Healthy) Child is
Born! Reconceptualizing ‘‘Harm’’ in Wrongful Conception’, Social and Legal Studies 13
(2004), pp. 5–26 and V. Chico, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis
for Novel Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic Technology (London: Routledge
Cavendish 2011).
36. Rees Lord Scott, para 356.
37. Rees Lord Millett, para 123.
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interference with autonomy is capable of being recognized in the tort of negligence,38 it
follows that outcomes which result from the failure to offer genetic choice could be
considered to be legal harm.39 However, it is unlikely that the courts will be prepared to
recognize frustrated choice as a harm in and of itself. They are likely to require the
frustrated choice to lead to some further tangible outcome.40 Indeed, although Rees can
be interpreted as providing a remedy for the interference with autonomy, the reasoning
suggests that the House of Lords required the interference with that interest to lead to
more tangible consequences which the law could conceive to be harmful. Thus it might
be argued that in Rees it was crucial to Ms Rees success that she had had a child. Given
that the claimant in ABC has given birth to the child, this outcome could be seen as an
interference with her interest in autonomy as she would have elected not to have the child
if the information which existed, which would have allowed her to make this choice, had
been disclosed to her.
Government figures suggest that the approach to wrongful birth claims out of court
does recognize that the birth of an unwanted child can be considered harmful. The
National Health Service has paid out more than £95 million since 200341 on 164 suc-
cessful claims for damages from parents wanting compensation for the birth of a child.42
Thus although the leading UK legal authority on wrongful birth rules that the birth of a
child is not in itself legal harm,43 practice has evolved such that this legal doctrine does
not seem to reflect the practical approach to the recognition of legal harm.
The type of harm alleged in ABC is not the only potential adverse outcome that might
follow a failure to disclose a genetic risk. Indeed, in the legal sense at least, ABC
represents the thin end of the harm wedge. The failure to disclose genetic information
may more commonly lead to the manifestation of a preventable medical condition, than
the birth of an unwanted child, and the manifestation of a preventable medical condition
is an outcome which the tort of negligence can readily recognize as harm.44 Consider the
claim where a patient’s familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP) diagnosis is not commu-
nicated to her child who has a 50% chance of possessing the FAP gene which is almost
38. Other cases that suggest that this might be a possibility are Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL
41 and Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCACiv 37. See also the
author’s previous work on recognising harm in the form of interference with autonomy in
the tort of negligence Chico, ‘Genomic Negligence’.
39. See my previous work on this issue Chico, ‘Genomic Negligence’.
40. See my previous work on the interest in autonomy as the basis for novel actions in the tort of
negligence. Chico, ‘Genomic Negligence’.
41. When Rees was heard.
42. Available at: http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id¼2014-09-09.208750.h&
s¼speaker%3A24927#g208750.q0) (accessed 18 April 2016). Available at: http://www.
conservativewoman.co.uk/philippa-taylor-compensation-culture-gone-mad-cash-strapped-
nhs-shells-millions-unwanted-healthy-babies/ (accessed 22 March 2016).
43. The House of Lords decision in McFarlane which has been upheld in Parkinson and Rees.
44. In Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2 if the delay in diagnosis had on the balance of
probabilities prevented the cancer from being cured, the case would not have turned on
whether the advanced cancer amounted to a personal injury.
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100% penetrant,45 and where the risk of the manifestation of bowel cancer can be
prevented or minimized by screening, surveillance or surgery.46 Where a doctor fails
to provide this opportunity to have treatment which will almost certainly avoid physical
harm, the case will not turn on whether the loss amounts to legally recognizable harm
and correspondingly whether there is a duty not to be careless where that carelessness
does not cause harm. However, because it is currently not considered to be careless for
doctors not to disclose genetic information to patients’ families, any harmful outcome,
not matter how clear it is, will not receive a remedy because the lack of a legal wrong is
fatal to the imposition of a duty of care.
However, the wrongful birth cases appear to demonstrate that the courts are struggling
to refuse to recognize harm where a careless action, which is clearly recognized as a legal
wrong, has led to the very outcome that the wrong was supposed to prevent. This wrongful
birth jurisprudence has developed on the basis of distributive justice, as determined by how
the courts assume ordinary people will feel about providing a remedy based on the birth of
a child. Unsurprisingly, the courts are unable to portray certainty in their thinking about
how ordinary people will feel about awarding damages for the birth of a wrongfully born
child.47 Thus we are left with judicial intuitions of what they think the public will accept.
Although the House of Lords was firm in its view that people would think the birth of a
child should not constitute actionable harm in McFarlane, the Court of Appeal in Par-
kinson and a differently constituted House of Lords in Rees, thought that ordinary people
would recognize a harm in a birth that the defendant had undertaken to prevent. Thus it
might be argued that the existence of a legal wrong, and the courts’ perception of corre-
sponding sympathy that is likely to be felt for the victim of a legal wrong, influenced the
expansion of the boundaries of actionable harm in the context of wrongful birth.
The legal recognition of interference with the interest in autonomy as harmful in Rees
will allow the claimant in ABC to portray harm if this point is addressed in the Court of
Appeal. However, the crux of the judgment in the High Court was that, irrespective of the
outcome, the non-disclosure did not constitute a wrong. Although there is ambiguity
concerning whether a wrong that does not lead to a harmful outcome can be the subject
of a duty of care,48 it is clear that the converse of a harm without a wrong is not sufficient
to establish liability. Indeed, relying heavily on the judgment in ABC, in Smith v.
45. Meaning that a person with the relevant mutation in this gene is almost certain to develop
colorectal cancer before they are 40. M. William Audeh, ‘Genetic and Environmental Factors
in Cancer Pathogenesis’, in H. Silberman and A.W. Silberman (eds) Principles and Practice
of Surgical Oncology (London: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, 2010), pp. 29–50.
46. S. Winawer, R. Fletcher, D. Rex, et al., ‘Colorectal Cancer Screening and Surveillance:
Clinical Guidelines and Rationale—Update Based on New Evidence’, Gastroenterology
124 (2003), pp. 544–560.
47. There are many reasons why the judiciary might find reflection of popular views difficult.
The issue may be one on which pubic views are scattered and/or ambivalent, especially
where there are plausible arguments for and against each approach as in the ‘wrongful birth’
cases. Furthermore the judiciary is not often in a practical position to know with clarity what
public opinion is because empirical evidence is lacking.
48. See the earlier discussion of cynical and idealistic approaches to duties of care.
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University of Leicester NHS Trust,49 the High Court recently struck out a claim where a
personal injury was suffered because of an omission in the treatment of another which
lead to a failure to disclose information to the injured party. Despite striking the claim
out, the court recognized that injury was reasonably foreseeable50 but they declined to
provide a remedy for that personal injury on the basis that it did not result from a legal
wrong. However, as the argument here demonstrates, the courts have developed legal
conceptions of actionable harm based on a perception that ordinary people will be
disposed to recognize an outcome as harmful where it results from a legal wrong. Thus
might the courts similarly develop legal conceptions of what is wrongful where an act or
omission results in legally recognized harm? If a claim concerning a non-disclosure of
genetic information does lead to harmful outcomes, whether that be the birth of a child as
in ABC, or a clearer perception of harm in the form of the manifestation of an avoidable
genetic condition,51 will the sympathy that people feel for those who suffer harm influ-
ence them to perceive the action which caused the harm as wrongful? In the wrongful
birth context, reliance on perceptions of public opinion led to the development of new
conceptions of legal harm. If we consider non-disclosure of genetic information to a
relative who then suffers a harm which could easily receive legal recognition,52 judicial
perceptions of sympathetic public opinion might influence the courts to expand cate-
gories of wrong accordingly.
As with the question of whether people who seek sterilization should be seen to have
suffered harm when carelessness in that sterilization leads to the birth of a child, the issue
of whether doctors should have a duty to warn patients’ relatives of genetic risks is likely
to be an issue which, on the face of it, could be subject to conflicting public opinions,
because it impinges on a number of different competing claims to the public interest. It
has long been recognized in English law that the public interest is served by maintaining
confidence in medical relationships which will promote candour.53 Competing public
interests have only overridden this interest where there is a clear risk of serious physical
harm to the public.54 However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that this traditional
view of medical relationships where individualism and confidentiality set the parameters
does not reflect public opinion in the context of familial sharing of genetic information
concerning highly relevant and actionable genetic risks. Indeed, if relying on public
opinion is relevant in developing legal rules,55 non-disclosure of genetic information
49. Smith v. University of Leicester NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 817 (QB).
50. Smith, para 20.
51. As in the familial adenomatous polyposis example offered above.
52. Perhaps as in the example of the manifestation of a readily treatable genetic condition.
53. X v. Y [1988] 2 All ER 648.
54. W v. Egdell [1989] EWCA Civ 13. There is a developed US jurisprudence on the duty to
warn of many different risks. However this case law has been subject of numerous previous
articles and is therefore not discussed here. See in particular Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California 17 Cal. 3d 425.
55. As it was in the ‘wrongful birth’ litigation. Although there are scholars who doubt that this
is an appropriate mechanism for developing the law. See, for example, A. Beever
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).
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is an area where reflecting public opinion is increasingly possible because of the signif-
icant and growing evidence of public views. However, in ABC, this empirical evidence
did not influence the judge’s discussion of the implications of recognizing a duty to
disclose genetic risks.
Non-disclosure of genetic information: Developing perceptions
of legally recognized wrongs
According to Nicol J., the failure to disclose the genetic information in ABC amounted to
an omission.56 In the absence of a principle, such as reliance57 or an assumption of
responsibility,58 which might import a special relationship, he felt that the defendant had
done nothing wrong in failing to disclose the genetic information to the claimant. Thus
the claim was struck out on the basis that there was no reasonably arguable duty of
care.59 This decision was heavily influenced by general concerns about the wider impli-
cations that counsel for the defendants argued would follow if doctors owed a duty to
disclose genetic information to patients’ relatives. In analysing the appropriateness of
these policy concerns in the context of imposing a duty of care for non-disclosure of
genetic risk generally, this article will assume recognized legal harm,60 such that any
duty of care would correspond with the cynical perspective on the existence of duties.
The nine policy issues cited by Nicol J. focussed on the position that doctors would be
in if they owed potentially conflicting duties to patients to maintain confidence, and to
patients’ relatives to prevent harm through disclosure of information.61 Essentially, the
nine policy issues boiled down to three overarching concerns; first, that a duty could
impact on the doctor–patient relationship, thereby undermining trust and confidence.
Second, that doctors would have no way of knowing whether or not people wanted to be
informed, and this situation might expose them to additional liability. Cumulatively,
these concerns led to a third concern that a duty would place burdensome responsibilities
on doctors which would incur time and resources distracting them from treating
patients.62 However, it might be argued that this analysis is largely based on assump-
tions. First, the judge assumed that the issue of genetic disclosure was only relevant in
the doctor–patient context.63 Following this, he made a number of assumptions about
how doctors, patients and their relatives feel about the receipt of, and sharing of, genetic
information which led him to over-emphasize the importance of protecting doctors from
a duty of care. This article considers the judge’s policy concerns in light of empirical
56. ABC, para 28.
57. ABC, para 28
58. ABC, para 28.
59. ABC, para 31.
60. Whether that is because the birth of an unwanted child is clearly recognized as harmful, or
because the harm is the manifestation of a preventable genetic condition; as presented in the
familial adenomatous polyposis example above.
61. ABC, para 13.
62. ABC, para 13.
63. Nicol J. considered all nine policy reasons from the perspective of doctors only.
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evidence of attitudes towards receiving and sharing genetic information which presents a
more balanced view of the concerns that might be raised in the context of a duty to
disclose genetic information.
The implications for the doctor–patient relationship
The situations where genetic information that is relevant to people’s health choices
might arise are broad and complex. Genetic testing is available in a variety of different
commercial, research and non-commercial settings. The refusal to recognize a duty of
care to relatives in ABCwas based exclusively on the impact that the imposition of a duty
might have on the nature of the relationship between the doctor and the tested patient.64
Nicol J.’s consideration of the issue exclusively from the perspective of doctors
overlooks the fact that people other than doctors might obtain genetic information that
could be important to the health of another. There are many other health professionals
who may come into receipt of genetic information in the same way as doctors, which
could be shared with the families of their patients not least, genetic counsellors and
nurses. The exclusive focus on doctors in ABC may leave other healthcare professionals
confused about whether the same legal rules apply to them. Although other health
professionals may come to learn of genetic information in the same way as doctors,
they might spend more time with patients and families than doctors and might not feel
that a duty of care would impact on their position in the same way as the court in ABC
thought it might impact upon a doctor’s position.65
As whole genome sequencing becomes more common in clinical, research and com-
mercial contexts, many different and diverse professionals may receive additional infor-
mation about a patient’s or participant’s genetic risks which may or may not have been
predicted and provided for by way of consent. Indeed, the issue of what duties health
professionals might owe to their patients in the context of projects like the 100,000
Genomes Project is currently under debate.66 In some ways this represents a different
situation to disclosing information to relatives because the notion of consent might
operate. Nevertheless, it is similarly a situation where there is no legal authority deter-
mining whether the would-be disclosee owes a duty of care. In the 100,000 Genomes
Project, people are asked to consent to receive information about a small list of addi-
tional findings.67 Where a consent to disclosure of particular information is gained, it
might be argued that an assumption of responsibility follows the act of gaining consent to
disclosure, such that if the relevant genetic information is present, a subsequent non-
disclosure of this information is a prima facie wrong, for which it is difficult to deny a
duty of care. However, not all situations where additional genetic risk information arises
64. ABC, para 13.
65. The impact on doctors predicted in ABC is based on the court’s view of potential impact, as
opposed to the view of the medical profession.
66. See for example my previous work on this issue V. Chico, ‘Requiring Genetic Knowledge:
A Principled Case for Support’, Legal Studies 35 (2015), pp. 532–550.
67. Available at: http://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/taking-part/patient-information-sheets-
and-consent-forms/ (accessed 18 March 2016).
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about a patient will be covered by consent. The list of conditions whereby consent to
disclosure can be given are drawn up by clinicians because of the characteristics of these
conditions, mainly that they are actionable. On this model, these mutations are then
actively looked for. True incidental findings might not be planned for or consented to.
This wider view of circumstances where disclosure of genetic information might
be relevant and the professionals who might have responsibilities in relation to this
disclosure, calls into question the singular focus on the impact of doctor–patient
relationship in ABC.
The conflict with the duty to maintain confidence
Where patient information cannot provide a benefit to others, maintaining confidence is
likely to be of significant import to patients. However, there is a growing discourse
addressing the role of confidentiality in the context of information which could be
beneficial to the health of others specifically or generally.68 Indeed there are a number
of ways that otherwise confidential patient data can be used in a manner which does not
breach confidence.69 The competing arguments portraying both public and private inter-
ests at stake in maintaining and breaching confidence have been well rehearsed else-
where.70 This article does not seek to repeat these arguments. However, much of this
literature approaches the concept of confidence from a general perspective which
assumes a conflict between confidence and the duty to warn. We should not generally
assume this conflict in the circumstances of familial sharing of actionable genetic infor-
mation because empirical evidence suggests that it rarely exists. Indeed, while it is clear
that people do value the confidentiality of their health data, it seems that the key concern
for people in terms of their health data is not whether their information is kept a secret
from the rest of their family. Here there seems generally to be a culture of sharing that is
not well reflected in the theoretical literature addressing the relative interests in
68. See for example the Information Governance Review March 2013 Available at: https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192572/2900774_
InfoGovernance_accv2.pdf (accessed 22 March 2016); J. Persson, ‘Care.Data: The
Economic Value of Data Versus the Public Interest?’, Available at: https://www.statslife.
org.uk/opinion/2282-care-data-the-economic-value-of-data-versus-the-public-interest
(accessed 22 March 2016); C.F. Wright, E. Hurles and H.V. Firth ‘Principle of
Proportionality in Genomic Data Sharing’, Nature Reviews Genetics 17 (2016) pp. 1–2;
A. Davey, A. Newson and P.O. Leary, ‘Communication of Genetic Information Within
Families: The Case for Familial Comity’, Bioethical Inquiry 3 (2006), pp. 161–167; H.
Widdows, ‘Between the Individual and the Community: The Impact of Genetics on Ethical
Models’, New Genetics and Society 28 (2009), pp. 173–188; C. Foster, J. Herring and M.
Boyd, ‘Testing the Limits of the ‘Joint Account’ Model of Genetic Information: A Legal
Thought Experiment,’ Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2015), pp. 379–382.
69. For example, consent, public interest and statutory grounds provide for use of otherwise
confidential patient data. In particular see The Health Service (Control of Patient
Information) Regulations 2002 and the work of the Confidentiality Advisory Group.
70. See in particular G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-legal Norms.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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maintaining and breaching confidence. It might be argued that this culture of sharing
ought to diminish the concerns associated with imposing conflicting duties on doctors71
because, given the culture of sharing, such a conflict rarely occurs.
Recent empirical research shows that most people do not place significant importance
on confidentiality where information might allow relatives to avoid a genetic condi-
tion.72 This research demonstrates that people overwhelmingly want relevant genetic
information, believe their interest in knowing this information should override their
relative’s right to keep it confidential and would forgo their own confidentiality so
that their relatives could have this information.73 Thus the situation where health pro-
fessionals have information that is not known by the relative, where they feel it would be
appropriate to disclose, where that disclosure is not supported by the patient, is not likely
to occur particularly often. If conflict between the duty to disclose and the duty to
maintain confidence will be a rare occurrence, this diminishes the relevance of this
concern and therefore its justification for the argument that a duty to disclose should
not be imposed. Indeed the norm in the context of the duty to disclose will be that the
doctor explains the need to inform relatives to the patient, and the patient discloses the
information to their relatives with support from the multidisciplinary team.
Nevertheless, a minority will refuse to disclose information to their relatives. It is in
this context that Nicol J.’s concerns about the doctor–patient relationship crystallize. His
concern is that conflicting duties would ‘undermine the trust which is so important to the
doctor/patient relationship’.74 Again the importance of trust in doctor–patient relation-
ships and the role that the duty to maintain confidence plays in establishing that trust has
been well considered elsewhere.75 However, it might be argued that attributing utmost
importance to the concept of confidentiality even where maintaining confidence pre-
vents another’s ability to avoid harm represents a one-dimensional interpretation of trust
in medical relationships which might not be appropriate in the context of genetic med-
icine. Most medical treatment relationships involve more than just the patient and one
doctor. Doctors work in multidisciplinary teams and people exist in relationships, some
of which involve a high degree of dependence. Increasingly, the model of patient care
adopted in genetic medicine reflects this relational focus and treats families as opposed
to individual patients.
In modern genetic medical practice, it is not uncommon for geneticists/genetic
counsellors to assume a responsibility for the genetic well-being of families. Indeed
the Association of Genetic Nurses and Counsellors describes the aims of genetic
counselling as:
71. Cited by Nicol J. at para 13.
72. T.J. Heaton and V. Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing of Genetic Information with at-
Risk Relatives: Results of a Quantitative Survey’, Human Genetics 135 (2016), pp. 109–
120.
73. T.J. Heaton and V. Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’.
74. ABC, para 13.
75. See, for example, G. Laurie, ‘Genetic Privacy’ and R. Chadwick, ‘Genetic Diagnostic
Information and the Duty of Confidentiality’, Medical Law International 1 (1993),
pp. 73–95.
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to help the individual or family understand the information about the genetic condition,
appreciate the inheritance pattern and risk of recurrence, understand the options available
and make decisions appropriate to their personal and family situation.76
The issue of whether to disclose genetic information to a person which might give
them the opportunity to make choices which they would not otherwise be able to make,
has long been an element of the genetic professions.77 However, any professional
assumption of responsibility has not led to a legal duty, as such the traditional legal
duty to maintain confidence sets the legal guidance in the context of disclosure of genetic
information to relatives. However, the absence of a recognized duty to warn patients’
relatives of relevant genetic risk information has led to grievances concerning failures to
disclose genetic information that a patient’s relative could have acted upon, which have
been settled out of court in favour of the relative.78 In the professional context, this kind
of settlement can have a significant impact on practice, influencing the profession to act
as if it were subject to a duty which is over and above the duty imposed by the law.79
Indeed, a recent systematic review and synthesis of empirical research showed that
health professionals generally felt some responsibility to patients’ relatives to disclose
information.80 This responsibility was most acutely experienced by genetic counsellors
and geneticists. Two US studies, one with genetic counsellors81 and one with clinical
geneticists82 found that 63% (161/257) of genetic counsellors and 69% (143/206) of
geneticists, perceived an obligation to disclose. This sense of a responsibility to disclose
can also be seen in the theoretical literature where a number of commentators argue for a
familial approach where genetic risk information is treated as a familial resource. Gilbar
advocates the adoption of a relational perception of autonomy, which, in the context of
genetics, takes into account the effect that any decision – whether to disclose or not to
disclose – will have on the familial relationship and the dynamics of the particular
76. Available at: http://www.agnc.org.uk/media/689675/careerasageneticcounsellor2.pdf
(accessed February 19 2016).
77. See, for example, K. Offit, et al., ‘The ‘‘Duty to Warn’; B.M. Knoppers, Y. Joly, J. Simard,
et al. ‘The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose Genetic Research Results:
International Perspectives’, European Journal of Human Genetics 14 (2006), pp. 1170–
1178.
78. Personal communication with a geneticist at The British Society for Genetic Medicine 22–
24th September 2014, Arena and Convention Centre, Liverpool.
79. C. Foster and J. Miola, ‘Who’s in Charge? The Relationship Between Medical Law,
Medical Ethics and Medical Morality?’, Medical Law Review 23 (2015), pp. 505–530.
80. S. Dheensa, A. Fenwick, S. Shkedi-Rafid, et al., ‘Health-care Professionals’ Responsibility
to Patients’ Relatives in Genetic Medicine: A Systematic Review and Synthesis of
Empirical Research’, Genetics in Medicine 18 (2016), pp. 290–301.
81. R.B. Dugan, G.L. Wiesner, E.T. Juengst, et al. ‘Duty to Warn at-risk Relatives for Genetic
Disease: Genetic Counselors’ Clinical Experience’, American Journal of Medical Genetics
(Sem Med Genet) 119C (2003), pp. 27–34.
82. M.J. Falk, R.B. Dugan, M.A. O’Riordan, et al. ‘Medical Geneticists’ Duty to Warn
at-risk Relatives for Genetic Disease’, American Journal of Medical Genetics 120A
(2003), pp. 374–380.
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family.83 Parker and Lucassen argue that the familial approach to genetic information is
an important aspect of establishing trust in genetics professionals. They propose the
‘joint account’ model where the question becomes not when to respect confidentiality
but what, if anything, would justify excluding others from the joint account.84 It is
assumed that information should be available to all account holders unless there are
good reasons to do otherwise. They argue that an advantage of the joint account model is
that it is consistent with the nature of practice in clinical genetics. Geneticists work with
families. This means that geneticists often come to know and to feel a sense of respon-
sibility for several members of the same family.85 In this context, Parker and Lucassen
do not focus on trust between individual patients and doctors. They present a different
perspective of how trust might be construed and undermined:
when relatives who were not informed about their risk develop symptoms or become aware
of their family history, and that this was withheld from them, they may lose trust in their
doctors. More generally, if it becomes widely known that information of this kind is being
routinely withheld, at the request of affected family members, it may lead to a more
widespread crisis of trust in the clinical genetics service and possibly legal action.86
This attitude of sharing genetic information to gain the trust of families is also
reflected in professional guidance,87 demonstrating that the practice of genetic medicine
adopts a more progressive familial interpretation of trust as opposed to the traditional
individual patient interpretation which is at the heart of approaches which favour con-
fidentiality. From the perspective of modern genetic practice, it might be argued that the
legal approach of championing confidence in the face of avoidable harm reflects out-
dated thinking which does not reflect the current professional approach. The wider view
of sharing as crucial to trust, rather than inimical to it, will allow information to be shared
in a way that enables a clearer and better approach to individual disease, but also furthers
knowledge of the genetic condition generally, thereby allowing genetic medicine to fulfil
its potential.88
83. R. Gilbar, ‘Communicating Genetic Information in the Family: The Familial Relationship
as the Forgotten Factor’, Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (2007), pp. 390–393.
84. A. Lucassen and M. Parker, ‘Genetic Information: A Joint Account?’, British Medical
Journal 329 (2004), pp. 165–167.
85. Lucassen and Parker, ‘Genetic Information’.
86. Lucassen and Parker, ‘Genetic Information’.
87. Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Pathologists and British Society for Human
Genetics. Consent and Confidentiality in Clinical Genetic Practice: Guidance on Genetic
Testing and Sharing Genetic Information. 2nd ed. Report of the Joint Committee on
Medical Genetics. London: RCP, RCPath, 2011.
88. Many questions concerning whether to disclose genetic information will arise in situations
where a geneticist is involved. If Parker and Lucassen’s view reflects a more general
position, then geneticists and genetic counsellors might not struggle with this duty in a
way that the High Court thinks that non-genetically qualified clinicians might. If this is the
case, a greater role for genetic counsellors in mainstream medicine might be appropriate.
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Genetic professionals’ desire to share genetic information in families is reflected in
the attitudes of patients and the public. Empirical evidence demonstrates that people are
generally happy to forgo their own confidentiality in the context of genetic findings
relevant to family members. Recent empirical investigation of people’s views on sharing
genetic information in families provided estimates of the views of the British public; in
the case of a fatal and preventable disease, the study found that 93% of the British public
would be willing to forgo their confidentiality if their genetic information could benefit
family members,89 with 72% of people feeling strongly that they would be willing to
forgo confidence.90
Interestingly, the confidential information in ABC would have become known to the
claimant in the near future because her father was suffering from the symptoms of the
condition which he would not be able to conceal from her indefinitely. Information
which is in the public domain does not incur a duty of confidence. Where the information
will shortly, inevitably be in the public domain, but this is after the harm which the
information could prevent has occurred, as in the birth of the child in ABC, should the
balancing of relevant interests represent the temporary ability of the information to
remain confidential? Furthermore, the father in ABC specifically asked for his daughter
not to be told because she might ‘have an abortion’.91 The interest in confidence protects
the individual, by maintaining the secrecy of facts about them that they do not want
others to know, it is not a means of controlling the actions of third parties. Of course, a
person does not need to give their reasons for wanting to keep their information confi-
dential. However, we might want to question giving ultimate respect to confidentiality
where the secrecy of the information which is the subject of the confidence is temporary
and short-lived, and the reason for wanting to maintain confidence in any event is not to
protect secrecy per se, but to prevent another from averting the harm that will occur if the
information is kept secret until it emerges naturally. As it was, the father relied on his
interest in confidentiality to prevent his daughter from accessing her right to abortion in a
jurisdiction where women have a right to abortion which no other individual can inter-
fere with.92
The desire not to know genetic information
There is significant literature, and support in international human rights documents, for
the right not to know medical information about oneself.93 This is not a legal right but it
89. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’.
90. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’.
91. ABC, para 5.
92. Assuming they meet the Abortion Act 1967 criteria which would not have been difficult for
the claimant in ABC. Indeed parents of minors have no right to interfere with their child’s
right to have an abortion R (on the application of Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health
[2006] EWHC 37 (Admin).
93. See for example R. Chadwick, M. Levitt and D. Shickle (eds) The Right to Know and the
Right Not to Know Genetic Privacy and Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014); R. Andorno, ‘The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach’,
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cannot be ignored by those proving healthcare. Historically respecting the interest in not
knowing has been presented as problematic on the basis that there will be little clarity
regarding whether this is a right people want to exercise or not.94 The crux of the
problem is that we cannot find out whether or not people want to know by asking them
because this will make known the existence of, and essential quality of, the information.
The upshot of this kind of argument seems to be that there should be a default position of
non-disclosure on the basis that disclosure might offend the right not to know. Indeed
this is the position reflected by Nicol J. in his account of the policy reasons for declining
to impose a duty to warn. However again, it might be argued that the initial theoretical
position presenting the right not to know as problematic in the context of providing
warnings is not demonstrated in the emerging empirical evidence. Recent research
demonstrates that people have a very strong desire to know about actionable genetic
risks when that information arises from a test on their relative.95 An overwhelming
number of people (91%)96 want to know information about their genetic risk that arises
as a result of a test on a relative where it relates to a fatal and preventable disease.
Furthermore 63% of those people felt ‘very strongly’ that they would like to be
contacted.97
People feel particularly strongly that they should be informed of genetic information
which could lead to a choice to minimize or prevent a genetic condition,98 indicating that
preventability is instrumental in people’s desire to know genetic information. This leads
to a perception of harm where there is a manifestation of a genetic condition which could
have been prevented or minimized if the information had been disclosed. Furthermore as
discussed earlier, this kind of harm, that is, the manifestation of a preventable genetic
condition, is one which, theoretically the tort of negligence, is eminently able to
recognize.
Thus in the event of preventable genetic disease, people overwhelmingly do want to
know relevant information and there is little desire to exercise a right not to know. This
widespread and general desire to have actionable information, coupled with a perception
that harm has occurred when the choice which that information would have presented is
Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (2004), pp. 435–439; J. Raikka, ‘Freedom and a Right (Not) to
Know’, Bioethics 12 (1998), pp. 49–63; R. Chadwick, M. Levitt and D. Shickle (eds) The
Right to Know and the Right Not to Know (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997); Article 10(2) of the
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Article 5c of the
UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.
94. See for example Chadwick et al. ‘The Right to Know’.
95. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards Sharing’. See also Dheensa et al., ‘Health-care
Professionals’ Responsibility to Patients’ Relatives in Genetic Medicine: A Systematic
Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research’, Genetics in Medicine 18 (2016),
pp. 290–301.
96. 91% in this study where the sample was reweighted to reflect the demographics of the
British (i.e. English, Scottish and Welsh) population, to provide preliminary estimates on
the proportion of the public who do, and do not, favour disclosure.
97. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’.
98. S. Dheensa et al., ‘Health-care Professionals’.
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frustrated, may influence the view that people have suffered a wrong when they do not
receive information that they could act on to avoid deleterious outcomes. Nicol J. does
not distinguish between actionable and non-actionable genetic information when
describing the policy reasons which led him to the conclusion that it would not be just,
fair and reasonable to impose a duty to disclose information to relatives. However, it
might be argued that any duty could justifiably be limited to a duty to disclose infor-
mation which concerns a preventable or treatable genetic condition, where we know that
a desire not to know is very rare and, therefore, should not be a major concern impeding
disclosure. It is in the context of untreatable disease that uncertainty and doubt about the
desire to know kicks in.99 However, untreatable genetic risk could be the subject of a
default position of respecting the interest in not knowing. Here there is a stronger
argument that some people will want to exercise a right not to know.100 Furthermore
in the legal context it makes much less sense to impose a duty regarding conditions
which are not preventable because if the manifestation of the condition represents the
harm, and there was nothing the relative could have done in any event to prevent that
manifestation, the health professional will not have caused any harm by failing to
disclose the information about the genetic risk.
Nicol J. went as far as to suggest that people might suffer psychiatric harm if they
receive genetic risk information.101 However, if we focus on actionable information, as
was the case in ABC, we know that most people express a desire to know such infor-
mation, making such an adverse psychological reaction to disclosure unlikely. Indeed,
they are arguably more likely to suffer an adverse psychological reaction if they find
out that information existed that would have allowed them to prevent or minimize the
manifestation of a genetic condition after that condition has manifested and it is too
late. Further even if a person feels aggrieved in the first instance when they receive the
information, this may not be a lasting emotion. Especially in avoidable disease where
people can focus in minimizing any risk after receiving the relevant information.
Psychologists have consistently shown that a system of cognitive mechanisms, known
as the psychological immune system,102 operates to ameliorate the experience of
negative affect. Thus any distress that people experience upon learning adverse med-
ical results, which might include the increased risk of a genetic condition, is likely to
subside as the person’s psychological immune system kicks in,103 thereby making it
99. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’.
100. Heaton and Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing’. This study found that 25–40% of
participants did not want to know about non-preventable genetic conditions.
101. ABC, para 13.
102. D.T. Gilbert, E.C. Pinel, T.D. Wilson, et al. ‘Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias
in Affective Forecasting’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (1998), pp. 617–
638.
103. For a more detailed account of the psychological immune system, see J.A. Blumenthal,
‘Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting’, Indiana Law Journal 80
(2004), pp. 155–238; D.T. Gilbert, E. Driver-Linn and T.D. Wilson, ‘The Trouble with
Vronsky: Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States’, in L.F. Barrett and
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unlikely that a recognized psychiatric condition will result from knowing actionable
genetic information.104
A duty would be too burdensome
The third reason Nicol J. felt that it would not be just, fair and reasonable to impose a
duty to disclose genetic risk information on doctors was because it would be too burden-
some and would be a distraction from treating patients. However, the preceding discus-
sions of confidentiality and the interest in not knowing demonstrate that limiting the duty
to disclose to actionable risks puts significant boundaries around the duty which arguably
make it workable. In addition to these limiting mechanisms, most genetic conditions are
not currently preventable or treatable. This means that the duty to disclose information
would only crystallize in relation to a small number of genetic conditions. Indeed when a
working group of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG)
sought to construct a list of genetic ‘disorders where preventative measures and/or
treatments were available’,105 the list contained only 24 conditions relating to 57 genetic
mutations.106 Furthermore many of these disorders are very rare. All of this combines to
mean that it would be a very rare occasion where a doctor is in receipt of genetic risk
information, concerning a preventable condition, which would be useful to a patient’s
relative, who has no knowledge of the risk through family history, in a situation where
the patient objects to their relative having this information. From this perspective a duty
to disclose actionable genetic information to patients’ relatives is unlikely to represent
the burden Nicol J. suggests and, moreover, has the potential to save lives and contribute
to the knowledge about the genetic condition which affects the patient. These counter
arguments to Nicol J.’s policy concerns demonstrate how non-disclosure of genetic
information could realistically be perceived to be a wrong for which a duty of care is
owed where that non-disclosure leads to actionable harm. In these circumstances, declin-
ing to impose a duty of care on the basis that it would offend the notion of increment-
alism may well lead to a situation where the legal approach to the disclosure of genetic
risks does not reflect the perspectives of the relevant professionals and the public. It
P. Salovey (eds) The Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional
Intelligence (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), pp. 114–143.
104. See my extended case comment on ABC which focuses on the potential psychiatric harm
claim in the case. V. Chico, ‘Doctors Under no Duty’.
105. R.C. Green, J.S. Berg, W.W. Grody, et al., ‘ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of
Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing’, Genetics in Medicine 15
(2013), pp. 565–574. This list was for the purpose of determining the incidental findings,
which might arise in whole exome or whole genome sequencing, that patients could not
originally opt out of receiving.
106. Similar exercises in the United Kingdom have led to much smaller lists of preventable
conditions. Genomics England allows patients to opt-in to feedback of a small number of
looked-for additional clinically important findings. Available at: http://www.
genomicsengland.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/GenomicEnglandProtocol_030315_
v8.pdf (accessed 16 February 2016).
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might be argued that public reactions to legal decisions which fail to reflect public
opinion set the platform for the kind of incremental development which has historically
been problematic in English law.107 Thus in the light of the evidence of public and
professional views portrayed here, an approach which does adopt an extension of the
duty of care might bypass the problematic aspects of incrementalism that we have seen in
wrongful birth and psychiatric harm leading to these being areas of the law that are
universally subjected to criticism.108
Conclusion
Unlike the’ wrongful birth’ litigation, Nicol J. did not base his decision on the views of
ordinary people in ABC. Despite this, health professionals’ responsibilities to patients’
families to disclose information about elevated genetic risks seems to be an issue which
is of interest to the general public and, thus, one upon which they form strong views. The
empirical evidence cited here indicates that the decision not to impose a duty on doctors
to disclose information about avoidable genetic disease is not likely to be popular with
the public because they want to have, and share, this information, and they do not put
significant emphasis on confidentiality in these circumstances. If this is an issue upon
which the public has a view, and moreover a strong view, a legal decision which goes
against evidence of public opinion will require significant justification if it is to receive
public support. It is argued that the policy concerns cited by Nicol J. in ABC do not
provide a sufficiently significant justification for not imposing a duty to disclose in the
context of actionable genetic information. As knowledge about the relevance of genetic
information increases, we may find that there is little public support for the decision in
ABC. Indeed there is already a strong academic criticism of the case.109 If this position is
maintained in the Court of Appeal, the reaction of ordinary people might influence a
future court to change its position to fulfil its role of reflecting the interests of society. In
the wrongful birth litigation, the incremental development of the narrow view of what
people would be prepared to view as harmful led to an inconsistent approach based on
immaterial differences. In the context of non-disclosure of avoidable genetic risks evi-
dence of the desire to receive and share genetic information suggests that people are
readily motivated to perceive harm and a corresponding wrong if information is not
disclosed. If a result which reflects public opinion is achieved from the outset in the
context of disclosure of genetic information to at risk relatives, this will prevent the need
to introduce immaterial distinctions to reflect public opinion, thereby preventing this
area from becoming the next bad example of incremental development in the tort of
negligence.
107. As with the perception of the public view of the initial differing legal response to the claims
of the families and the police officers after the Hillsborough disaster.
108. Stapleton, ‘Restraint of Tort’.
109. See for example, R. Gilbar and C. Foster, ‘Doctors Liability to the Patient in Genetic
Medicine’, ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS trust [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB) Medical
Law Review 24 (2015), pp 112–123.
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